Robert McFarlane; the defeat in Vietnam

Robert McFarlane, the defeat in Vietnam

In an October 3, 2008 Wall Street Journal piece Robert McFarlane makes two interesting observations: “I recall very vividly April 30, 1975, the day we acknowledged defeat in the Vietnam War…”

and a few paragraphs later:

“Notwithstanding the hubris and intelligence failure regarding Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program, which motivated our launching the Iraq war in the first place, and our failure to plan for the likely contingency of an insurgency arising, it is difficult to imagine circumstances anywhere in the world today where the U.S. military cannot prevail if properly employed.”

One wonders how these two statements fit together in Mr. McFarlane’s head. That is, he acknowledges a military defeat in 1975, but in 2008, says that a military defeat by the U.S. anywhere on the planet  is difficult to imagine if it uses its forces properly.

Why the loss in Vietnam? I do not know how McFarlane would account for it, but there are some possibilities to explain his present optimism. First, since 1975 maybe the U.S. improved its war making capabilities more than its prospective foes did. Second, maybe the U.S. did not properly utilize its forces in Vietnam.

Well, the second possibility about how the troops were used, is a debate that will continue past the lifetime of the people who were there. It appears that this is the explanation that McFarlane favors: He tells us later in the review that senior U.S. military leaders knew that they could have won the war in Vietnam.

But the first possibility, that the U.S. has increased its military dominance in the world since the ’70s, is the more interesting thought.

Certainly, as far as nuclear weaponry is concerned, it is just not so. Of the many things that are up for debate concerning nuclear technology in a possible confrontation between the U.S. and China, what has happened to American vulnerability since the end of the war in Vietnam is undeniable. There cannot be any rational  argument that in the past 35 years, China has improved its ability to kill Americans more than America has improved its ability to kill Chinese. In 1975, the U.S. had the ability to totally destroy China; it still has that power. The more dramatic change is that in 1975 China’s ability to kill really large numbers of Americans was problematic. Today it is assured.

Mr. McFarlane itemizes several negative events that followed the American loss:
– Soviet foreign policy became more aggressive.
– The U.S. became less willing to criticize the Soviet Union and the position of minorities inside the Soviet Union became more vulnerable.
– European allies began dealing with the USSR without regard for the opinion of the US.
– The loss undermined the relationship between the military and civilian leadership.
– The average American became less willing to engage in foreign involvement.

However, he tells us that all is not lost. American power is still dominant.

“The next president will enter office with the war in Iraq winding down but with the conflict in Afghanistan requiring urgent, focused attention. . . How we emerge from Afghanistan will go far toward determining our ability to prevail in the global war against radical Islam, our ability to limit nuclear proliferation, and to bring order and the hope for a brighter future to the almost two billion people in South and Central Asia.”

That quote is as close as one get to a written capsulation of the hope and ambition of neoconservatism. In one particular McFarlane is certainly correct: If the American populace perceives Iraq as a failure, or even a disproportionate sacrifice for  a limited achievement, the country will be unwilling to underwrite further military adventures.

The key for the nuclear weaponry issue in the piece is the offhand reference to the hope for a “brighter future” for South and Central Asia.  One wonders, “How does the American military establishment regard Russian and Chinese engineers?”

 

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