What is the single most important fact that we know about the Russian onslaught (protective force) in Ukraine today? We KNOW that it will not cause an American nuclear response.
It will not turn into WW I or WW II because everyone is aware that there is a limit on the force America and NATO will use to dislodge the Russians. NATO will not use nuclear force.
Because Russia could use nuclear weapons on Iowa.
The Russians know that.
In Ukraine, the Russian nuclear engineer is the single biggest player on the scene. His identity as a Russian, specifically, is the most important part of his role.
In Vietnam he placed a lid on American force. America would not go nuclear because it was afraid the struggle would escalate and lead to nuclear war.
When the wall fell, and the Soviet Union collapsed, that engineer maintained his place. He just took off the mask that represented the Soviet Union and went about his business as a Russian. Which was what he had been called for 40 years anyway.
This is may not be the best of times; or the worst of times; but it is the most interesting of times since the end of the Vietnam catastrophe. The American narrative now ignores what happened in Vietnam, preferring to focus on President Reagan. “We win; you lose.”
Well, the main player in Vietnam was also present in the fall of communism and is now present in Ukraine: the Russian nuclear engineer. He presents a smile and a question: Should we kill everyone? Should we destroy 14 thousand years of human civilization in an afternoon?
We have all heard pundits discuss the severity of sanctions that should be used against the Russians. A Wall Street Journal editorial (March 14, 2014) holds for the most severe economic measures:
“The Kremlin says Russia will match Western measures tit-for tat, and Mr. Putin no doubt means it. But Russia’s economy is barely the size of Italy’s. It has oil, gas and little else. Russian capital flees at every opportunity, and nervous outside investors have sent Russian equities down sharply. In other words, the pain of economic war will be far worse for Russia than for the rest of the world.”
Holman Jenkins (WSJ , March 19, 2014) endorses sanctions on the hope/assumption that the forces surrounding Putin will blink:
If the West wants to do more than just go along for the ride-the policy of the past 15 years- the time to act is now while some semblance of an independent elite still exists.
In point of fact, however, no sober person could imagine that Putin will abandon Crimea, no matter how severe the sanctions. And the history of sanctions forcing a state to surrender in the modern age does not support optimism. Think Cuba.
The Neocons appreciate that. So they do not stop with economic sanctions. A WSJ editorial for March 7, 2014, would whisper the word “nuclear” albeit coupled with the word “defense.” The writer would reverse the 2009 decision to cancel the ballistic missile sites for Poland and the Czech Republic. “Such a move on missile defense would send the Kremlin into a fit of rage, but it would also be the first time Mr. Obama did anything other than get rolled by Russia.”
Bret Stephens (WSJ March 11, 2014) seconds the notion that a good defense is a great offense.
The right response to a Russian power play is a power play of our own. Ballistic missile defenses on NATO’s eastern flank would be a good place to start.
But no one in fact expects that employing a missile defense would do anything to Russia other that cause it to do what it has threatened before. Station the missiles closer to Europe. What would the Wall Street Journal say to that? A March 17, 2014, editorial tells us
Reviving an updated version of the Bush-era missile defense installation in Eastern Europe is also warranted, including advanced interceptors that could eventually be used against Russian ICBMs.
No one in Europe with a room temperature IQ would bet literally everything that the U.S. has interceptors that could promise them security should Russia set off thousands of mid and long range ballistic missiles that could destroy everything in Europe in less than an hour. It is preposterous to suggest that the U.S. has interceptors that could promise a 100 percent success rate should a full scale nuclear exchange begin.
We have scaled the wall. From economic sanctions, to more severe economic sanctions, to putting nuclear defenses in places Russia does not want them. Finally we come to where you and I knew we would have to arrive: The top of the wall. Will some patriot advocate upping the offensive nuclear threat? Sure enough.
In Jim Thomas’ column, “How to Put Military Pressure in Russia,” (WSJ March 10, 2014) a window summarizes the recommendation:
NATO now has reason to station nuclear forces in front-line member states.
Perfect.
Now anyone who has spent some time here knows the essential message of this blog: Nuclear weapons are IQ tests. The fact that America has a 16 trillion dollar economy and is now as vulnerable to a nuclear attack as China or Russia is not anomalous. The fact that it has a much bigger economy than Russia and China would be dispositive if the only weapons systems available were sub-nuclear systems. But nuclear systems: the blast, the missile delivery and the instrumentation that can place the blast inside an American grammar school in minutes, basically trump the advantages of a 16 trillion dollar economy. The blast, the missile and the instrumentation are not that expensive. Their prime ingredient is a 15 year old boy who can write a 785 on the math SAT. The Chinese and the Russians have found that boy.
This post is not meant to celebrate Russia, or Russian aggression. The West of Ukraine has its legitimate arguments.
Should Ukraine have given up its nuclear weapons? That question has been played by various pundits time and time again.
Milan A. Racic, (WSJ March 14, 2014) tells us, “Ukraine now looks incredibly naive to have agreed to give up its nuclear weapons.” I am not sure.
My position. First, who created the weapons. If they were mostly ethnic Russians, maybe there would now be a struggle inside the nuclear installations. Maybe Russian speakers would have won some and the Ukrainians would have won some. Would Ukraine be better off if the specifically ethnic struggle between Ukrainians and Russian speakers were playing out now over nuclear weapons?
Equally important, is everyone sure that Putin, with his own nuclear threat would have been dissuaded from the Crimea, at least, because Ukraine also held a nuclear threat?
In 2014 there is a nuclear complication that was unforeseen in 1964, or 1974, or 1984, or 1994; and even 2004. That complication is China. It is interesting to me how little punditry attention has been paid to that Chinese sub, carrying potentially millions of American deaths.
“Beijing Stands With Moscow” is the title of the editorial. (WSJ March 18, 2014) Predictably, I think, if one could reasonably assume the Chinese will never forget hundreds of years of signs “Chinese and Dogs, Keep Out.”
The writer thinks that it is because of their rulers affinity for authoritarian government. Well, as the kids say, “Whatever.”
The fact is everyone expects that the Ukrainian crises will be resolved several centuries before that sub carrying death for millions of American children leaves the ocean. Some time should be put into not making the sub problem; which is the engineering problem; which is the math 785 SAT problem, worse than it is in April 2014.
Mitt Romney (WSJ March 18, 2014) makes an important concession to reality. Once protests began, he says, President Obama should have begun steps to secure solidarity with America’s allies and to prepare for sanctions and punishments should Russia invade. However, he has the good sense to recognize that Russia could not be expected to just walk away from a commercial and military investment that Russian speakers have been building for centuries. For Romney the punishments should have been accompanied by “[A]ssurances that we would not exclude Russia from its base in Sevastopol, or threaten its influence in Kiev.”
Understanding that is a reasonable start toward unwinding a military risk in the most interesting world there has ever been: A world with nuclear weapons.
RP
